


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ETHIOPIA: A CASE STUDY FOR NATIONAL AND MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN D. CATLIN
United States Army

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by

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Mr. Walter Clarke Ambassador Daniei H. Simpson Project Advisors

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# ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: John D. Catlin, Mic. USA

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The end of the Cold War also marked the end of superpower engagement in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia, large and strategically located, has been the focus of a U.S. national interest for 40 years. This paper details those interests as they evolved and substantially changed during the regime of they evolved and substantially changed during the regime of Emperor Haile Selassie, which ended in 1974, during the Marxist-Leninist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam, which ruled from 1976 to 1991, and, finally, during the democratically focused regime of Meles Zenawi, in power from 1991 to present. Of particular interest is the Eritrea case, which could begin the ethnic division of Ethiopia and thereby provide a model for Arrica. International and national interests in Ethiopia are examined, with the conclusion that numaritarian interests are strongest and other strategic interests are no longer vital internationally or to the U.S.

#### INTRODUCTION

Ethiopia firmly and rightfully occupies the anchor position of what has come to be known throughout the world as the "arc of crisis," which extends from the Horn of Africa, through the Arabian peninsula, and into the Gulf region. True to its fame as a crisis zone, the current clan warfare in Somalia overlapped with the civil warfare leading up to the 1974 coup in Ethiopia, thereby continuing the decades-long conflict and crisis in the Horn. Ethiopia has had significance to the U.S. in its strategic location in the region, as well as in Africa as a whole, for over forty years. At this crossroads in history, namely the end of the cold war and the beginning of the so-called new world order, Ethiopia retains significance to U.S. national interests in the Horn, in Africa, and in the World.

This paper examines U.S. interests in Ethiopia, particularly from the establishment of the federal state of Ethiopia in 1952 to the present. It traces the disposition of these interests during the regime of Emperor Haile Selassie, which ended in 1974, during the Marxist-Leninist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam, who was deposed in 1991, and during the current democratically-focused regime of Meles Zenawi.

Ever dissonant in the background during these regimes was the insurrection in Eritrea, the Red Sea coastal region of Ethiopia, which finally ended in July 1991. A self-determination

referendum for the Eritreans is scheduled for April 1993.

Eritrea has the potential for successful nationhood, but a vote for independence by the Eritreans could have an adverse impact on Ethiopia and the region. The outcome of the referendum is uncertain - the Eritreans may vote to continue federation with Ethiopia. This paper includes a case study on Eritrea.

Finally, Ethiopia's place in the world will be examined, with a focus on humanitarian concerns. Ethiopia is struggling to establish a viable economy and democratic pluralism among religious and ethnic groups in a region fraught with natural disaster. The U.S. interests are in the areas of regional stability, human rights, and economic self-sufficiency. U.S. support to Ethiopia is dependent on continued progress by the Ethiopians in these areas.

## CURRENT SITUATION

Shortly after the capture of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 28 May 1991, Meles Zenawi, the leader of the coup, declared a new government of Ethiopia and, on 1 June 1991, placed himself in the position of interim president. Meles had been a guerrilla leader during the preceding fifteen years of guerrilla warfare. Having witnessed the terrible result of war based on ethnic rivalry, Meles and his government have focused their efforts on creating a federation of ethnic regions. In fact, Meles has gone so far as to announce the goal of producing a new constitution establishing a democratic government before the close of 1993. Consolidating

the ethnic groups is the most difficult challenge, yet Meles has at least created a ceasefire environment, with the positive result of lowering the death toll from internal strife from 10,000 people a month in 1990 to a few hundred a month at present.

In addition to the planned new constitution, democratic elections were held in Ethiopia on 21 June 1992. The election was found deficient by international observers, including U.S. representatives, primarily because the Omoro Liberation Front (ORF), a political party representing the Omoros, a major ethnic group comprising forty percent of the population, withdrew from the elections just prior to their being held. One positive sign was that the election problems did not erupt into ethnic warfare.

President Meles' party, the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF), is still providing the national army.
Internal military problems continue to plague Ethiopia.
"Hostilities have raged between the Afars and Tigreans, the
Gurages and Wolaytas, the Anuaks and Nuers, and the Oromos and
Tigreans."' The government still owns the land. The large army
of deposed President Mengistu, which was over 400,000 strong, is
being controlled until peacetime job placement can be made. "The
national conference of July 1991...put forward a set of
principles guaranteeing the rights of Ethiopia's national groups
to self-determination and the governance of their own affairs
within a federated state."' Meles remains committed to making
the federation work in a democratic government.

The current economic situation is Ethiopia is horrendous but is overshadowed in the western press by the dreadful situation in Somalia, where untold numbers of people face starvation because of factional fighting. The population of Ethiopia is roughly 36 million and the per capita annual income is approximately \$100 U.S. The percentage of government revenues spent on defense and security expenditures rose to 70 percent by 1990. "Maintaining the largest standing army in sub-Saharan Africa, one which has the added expense of protracted combat with heavy losses, has clearly contributed to the budget deficit and to diversion of resources from economic development and social programs."

In Ethiopia there are spoken over 70 different languages and 200 dialects. There are two major religions, Muslim and Christian, with major differences between the two in defining the social establishment. Other major problems currently include recurring drought, inflation, a dearth of manufacturing, reliance on agricultural products with unstable markets, and overextension on loans from international agencies. These and other problems are staggering, but Ethiopia is similar in many of these respects to other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Unfortunately, what happens in an African country affects the whole region in which the country is located.

# HISTORY

The Ethiopian people proudly claim that Ethiopia was never a colony during its 4500 years of recorded history. "Ferhaps 70%

incorporated through the conquests of Memelik II in the late 19th and early 20th centuries." Italy had influence off and on in Ethiopia from 1889 to 1936 and occupied Ethiopia from 1936 to 1941. From 1941 to 1952, Ethiopia was occupied by or under the trusteeship of England. This longstanding 'feudo-imperial legacy" provides the nationalism holding the ethnic groups together.

The United Nations (UN) wrestled with the status of the former Italian-held territory of Eritrea beginning in 1948. Eritrea had been a colony of Italy, with clear colonial boundaries, as had many other African nations. Like the other nations, the Eritreans had expected independence. This did not come to pass. "In 1948, after considerable vacillation and disagreement among the Great Powers, the disposition of the former Italian colonies was passed to the United Nations. After a protracted period of consultation with interested parties and two public referendums held by a special U.N. commission, the majority of the Eritrean population voted for union with Ethiopia. Finally, in 1952, Eritrea was reunited with Ethiopia under a compromise federal arrangement." Haile Selassie, the Head of State of Ethiopia, managed to keep the Eritrea question from becoming a regional issue by keeping it off the Organization for African Unity (OAU) agenda.

The federal solution for Ethiopia allowed Eritrea to remain an autonomous unit under the Ethiopian crown. This course of

action was supported by the United States and its allies but was opposed by the Soviet Union. Who, along with nine other nations, supported complete independence. "Ethiopia was the first African country (other than Liberia) in which the United States played a major role in the post WWII era." There were widespread suspicions that U.S. backing of Haile Selassie was a pay-off for Ethiopian base concessions on the Red Sea in Eritrea, soon to be granted to the U.S. In 1954, the U.S. established "a communication base at Kagnew in the Eritrean highlands" to support "its hascent nuclear submarine activity in the Indian Ocean." The Kagnew base was considered by the U.S. to be a strategically essentia, element in the East-West confrontation. The U.S. also provided the Selassie regime with large amounts of military aid.

The federation dissolved when, "on November 14, 1962. Haile Selassie annexed Eritrea - with the tacit support of the United States and without a murmur being heard in the United Nations...The Ethiopian army of occupation was bolstered with United States and Israeli help, and dispersed throughout Eritrea." The harsnness of this annexation by force caused the birth of the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) and the rebirth of organized resistance to Ethiopian domination. "[The] UN agreement federating Eritrea with Ethiopia but giving it autonomous status was abrogated by Selassie in 1967."

Civil war racked Ethiopia from 1970 to 1974. The control of Emperor Haile Selassie was waning, as rumors of his mental deterioration increased. A committee of opposition, calling itself the Derg, or "committee" in Amnaric, the official national language imposed in 1957, took over power in a revolution in 1974. Selassie died in captivity shortly thereafter. Mengistu Harle Mariam emerged as the leader of the Derg. "The announced the formation of his own party, called SEDED, in the spring of 1976, and became a Marxist-Leninist overnight." In November 1978, a treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed by the U.S.S.R. and Ethiopia. "Before the Ethiopian revolution in 1974. U.S. policy began to change toward Ethiopia, as its center of security for the northern Indian Ocean shifted to the new pro-American governments in Egypt under (Anwar el.: Sadat and in the Sudan under [Gafar] Nimeiri...Moreover, the decision was made to build Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean as a major communication point, and to phase out the Kagnew base."

The change to Marxist-Leninist political philosophy led swiftly to the U.S.S.R. providing support to Ethiopia.

"Ethiopia's and Semalia's political predilections... led to shifting superpower involvements, which...contributed to militarization of the Horn. The added dimension of superpower sponsorship...contributed to regional as well as broader strategic tensions in view of the Horn's key location."

Instead of the hopeful vision of the socialist revolution rapidly transforming the turbulent, economically-depressed Ethiopian society, the Ethiopians were subjected to more oppression by totalitarian military rule. "The disastrous economic and

agricultural policies adopted by the Derg. forced dislocation of the population, misallocation of resources, corruption.

Dureaucracy, civil war, and overall mismanagement...disintegrated the economy and depleted resources." The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was inaugurated in September 1987 and the violence associated with the socialist revolution continued.

Even though the United States and its allies focused their support during the era of the Mengistu regime on Somalia and Sudan, two states bordering Ethiopia, the U.S. continued humanitarian support to the Ethiopian people. The 1984-85 drought resulted in famine in Ethiopia. Even though there were clear political overtones in Mengistu's resettlement of portions of the population, especially the Eritreans, the U.S. continued to be the primary supplier of food.

## ERITREA

John Foster Dulles, the U.S. Secretary of State, stated in a speech before the UN Security Council in 1952: "From the point of view of justice, the opinions of the Eritrean people must receive consideration. Nevertheless, the strategic interest of the United States in the Red Sea basin and considerations of security and world peace make it necessary that the country...be linked with our ally, Ethiopia." U.S. strategy, then as now, had to have vision but also had to change with changing circumstances. The circumstances have undergone two major changes since Secretary Dulles' speech of forty years ago.

First, Ethiopia went from being a close ally of the U.S. to being a government ideologically opposed to the U.S. Then it became a government striving to be ideologically similar to the U.S., with a population needing U.S. humanitarian assistance. "The U.S. position today is that the aspiration(s) of the Eritrean people are legitimate and must be addressed by the Ethiopian government."

Eritrea is the region in the eastern part of Ethiopia that includes all of the Red Sea coastline of Ethiopia. Eritrea occupies 119,000 square kilometers and has a population of 3.5 million people. The boundaries define not an ethnic region, as Eritrea has more than ter ethnic groups, nor a religious region, as both Christianity and the Islamic religion are major regional religions. The boundaries are colonial boundaries "carved out by Italian colonists" in 1890", and as such provide Eritrea a legal basis for independence as decided by the UN shortly after the UN was established in 1948. "The Eritrean people's sense of entrapment and isolation, as succeeding colonial powers either encircled them or occupied their land, lies at the root of Eritrean nationalism and a fierce spirit of independence."

"The justifications of Ethiopia's claim on Eritrea were fundamental:

<sup>(</sup>a) Eritrea had been an integral part of Ethiopia from the beginning of known history. The people shared a common historical, cultural, religious and ethnic background.

<sup>(</sup>b) Ethiopia had an imperative need for direct access to the sea and the world at large...

<sup>(</sup>c) A strategic consideration was also the fact that throughout history major invasions directed toward Ethiopia came through the seashores.

(d) Another factor that gave impetus to the union was the massive migration of Eritreans (an estimated 1.5 million) toward the hinterland..."

"In July 1991 the Ethiopian Feople's Revolutionary

Democratic Front (EPRDF), representing the groups now in charge
[of Ethiopial . agreed to a transitional framework that clears
the way for Eritrean independence." President Meles is willing
to allow the self-determination referendum currently scheduled
for April 1993. He is confident that Ethiopia will not
compromise its future by allowing Eritrea to become independent,
thereby losing for Ethiopia the resources of Eritrea. He is
convinced that, given Ethiopia's size, population, and proud
history, greatness can be realized again if peace can be
maintained and stability achieved.

The Eritreans may indeed vote for federation with Ethiopia. Though ethnic boundaries can be approximately drawn, there has been significant movement across those boundaries. The Eritreans have been and are now employed at all levels of the government in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, and in Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, large numbers of workers from Ethiopia proper have been employed in Ethiopian industry. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Mengistu government forcibly relocated many Eritreans. There is some international support for federation, such as that voiced by the U.S., but any guarantees of international recognition will be withheld pending the results of the referendum.

There are several issues and obstacles associated with the potential independence of Eritrea. Ethiopia will need access to

sea ports in addition to the port access now arranged with Djibouti. An independent Eritrea would have the right to tax imports and control transit. There is already substantial movement of the labor force from other regions of Ethiopia to Asmara in Eritrea and from Eritrea to Addis Ababa and other parts of Ethiopia. Asmara is currently a key industrial base of Ethiopia. There will have to be agreement on the division of national issues in economics, politics, defense, and environmental cooperation. Finally, small national entities simply do not have the degree of influence on the world that larger countries do. As Meles stated regarding economic prospects, "It is simply not possible for all entities to achieve sustainable economic growth unless they are integrated into a large national market."

"The U.S. government is in the process of creating standards and principles by which it can respond to secession. Three criteria being developed are: (1) whether a new government controls territory; (2) whether it has resources necessary to develop a viable economy; and (3) whether it will live at peace with its neighbors." Clearly, Eritrea controls territory. With regard to the second criteria, that of resources necessary to develop a viable economy. Eritrea would have the coast near the Bab el Mandeb, through which passes the Red Sea maritime traffic bound for the Suez Canal, an area of coastal economic advantage. Eritrea also has a potential manufacturing base, but because of the civil war, none of the 44 existing factories in Eritrea is

operational. The Eritrean economy will have the impending financial drain of repatriating the estimated one million refugees living outside Eritrea. This repatriation has already begun under UN supervision. With respect to agriculture and the economy, the soil of Eritrea is rich but foreign assistance would still be required to make it profitable. Finally, Eritrea is the area of Ethiopia rich in minerals, again requiring foreign assistance to mine. As far as the last criterion, that of living at peace with neighbors, the Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front, which provides the interim government of Eritrea, has agreed to a peaceful settlement of the generation-long war against the Ethiopian military and other ethnic groups. Whether there will be peace within the Eritrean borders or whether ethnic clashes will flow over the borders is anyone's guess.

"Given the support the EPLF received from some Arab sources. an independent Eritrea might seek closer relations with the Arab world and could even apply for membership of the Arab League."
While Ethiopia was a declared Marxist-Leninist state and was supported economically and militarily by the U.S.S.R., Eritrean rebels received financial support from the Arab nations, especially Saudi Arabia. "The Arab countries had always supported the Eritrean cause for its Arabist struggle against Christian Ethiopia." Israel is the country most concerned. If an independent Eritrea were to strongly orient itself as an Arab state, then the Red Sea would, in effect, become an "Arab lake." Because of the unresolved nature of the Arab-Israeli

conflict, this would pose yet another threat to Israel, which has port facilities on the Red Sea.

The Eritrean rebels received very limited support from non-Arab-aligned neighbors. China, however, did support the Eritrean insurgents against Ethiopia during the 1970s and 1980s, offering "ideological and training input." China's support was probably part of a larger program to extend Chinese political influence to the masses of Africa. No significant agreement with the Eritrean rebels is known to have resulted.

One of the major problems sweeping the Eurasian and African continents is the fragmentation of nations. The new lines being drawn and defended are based on traditional ethnic boundaries, colonial or pre-assimilation boundaries, and religious boundaries. The Horn of Africa is a microcosm of all of this divisiveness. Borders in Somalia and Ethiopia are collapsing or being renegotiated by various means, both peaceful and violent. The potential for independence of Eritrea by self-determination in 1993 is setting a precedent for the rest of Africa, and, as previously noted, what happens in any one country of Africa has implications to the rest of Africa.

Meles maintains that "if democratic conditions are created and people's right to live in their own culture and express themselves are respected, the huge majority will resolutely choose unity over secession." This may be true, but it remains to be seen if the Eritreans will be able to see this truth, their

vision having been impaired by 40 years of Ethiopian domination and 30 years of civil war.

# INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

Ethiopia can be looked at as an example of the "racia:cultural-religious conflict between the Arabs of North Africa and
the Middle East on the one hand and the Blacks of Sub-Saharan
Africa on the other, compounded by the historical identification
of Arabs with Islam and of most Black political elite with
Christianity." There has been tension between Iran and Iraq to
extend influence in Africa. "Iran has counted its successes
among only black Africa states while Iraq has advanced its
influence among the Arab- and Muslim- dominated states in a broad
belt across Sahelian Africa to the Red Sea and including the
populations - if not all governments - of northern Africa."

With reference to the Horn, Saudi Arabia is particularly concerned about "Islamic fundamentalism's revolutionary winds" blowing from Iran. The concern of the Saudis is economic, referring to the control the Horn can exercise over Red Sea access at Bab el Mandeb and therefore the vitally important transport of petroleum. But it is also a concern over the basic conflict of Islamic precepts between the Saudis and the Iranians. No peaceful resolution of this divergence of Islamic beliefs has been found.

"Ethiopia [is] the fulcrum of events in the Horn." During the Gulf War in 1990, the Ethiopian government under Mengistu

aligned with the coalition forces against Iraq. ("Significantly, the United States made little use of facilities in the Horn during the war with Iraq." Historically. "Ethiopia was recognized as a tributary state, not only because of its strategic location on the Red Sea, but also because its Coptic ruling class was both anti-Muslim and non-Arab. Independence for Eritrea could initiate another alignment confrontation between Black and Arab Africa as well as Muslim and non-Muslim Africa.

Ethiopia has a long-established relationship with Israel, though the ultimate goal of Israeli military and economic aid is not clearly visible. In one view, "Israeli interest appears to lie in Ethiopia's willingness to allow emigration of the remaining Bete Israel peoples [Falasha], a limited interest not likely to lead Israel to major military funding of Ethiopia even if it had the capacity or inclination." With the 1991 extraction of the majority of the Falasha, taken from Ethiopia to Israel, the Israeli interest in Ethiopia became solely an issue of strategic access to Red Sea shipping routes. There is a distinct possibility of Ethiopia retaining its portion of the Red Sea coast if the Eritrean vote favors federation with Ethiopia over independence.

Meles, when asked about the economy of Ethiopia in late 1992, said, "At present our resource is the people. There is no money or material..." Agriculture is by far the primary industry of the country. It accounts for "40% of GDP, 90% of

exports and 85% of total employment." Given the rich soil and the size of the country and the population, agriculture in Ethiopia could provide food for the country and still provide significant exports. Ethiopia's minerals include potassium, iron, oil, gold, copper, and zinc, but at present there is no industry in mining, just as there is no significant manufacturing industry.

The problem is a common one in Africa. The internal struggle for power has depleted the resources needed to induce the growth of industry. At the same time, population growth has continued at an annual rate of three percent. Foreign investment is conditional upon sound economic policies, movement toward democracy and pluralism of political parties, respect for human rights, and, of paramount importance, peace. As the interim government struggles to meet these criteria, ethnic conflict. though not always violent, presents the specter of the further disintegration of an already fragile central government.

# HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS

In 1989, Charles M. Lichenstein of the International Security Council wrote: "Some in the Western democracies apparently believe that the Horn is of no appreciable value, strategic or otherwise. Immersed as it is in crises and rivalries that seem insoluble, it is a target only for empathy and humanitarian assistance." The recent rains in Ethiopia will be unlikely to alieviate the food debt that the population

Domestic Product figures be impacted in any but a negative way by the repatriation of the hundreds of thousands of refugees from the civil wars. The infrastructure in the broadest sense of the term must be improved, and this can be done only under the non-exploitive control of a central government that represents all of the people.

President Meles is trying to forge a federation within the territorial limits as currently defined for Ethiopia. To achieve cooperation among the leaders of the ethnic groups currently at odds will require incredible negotiating skill and the most open of dialog on ethnic, linguistic, religion . and regional differences. Also required is a consensus plan and the initial implementation of the plan. Foreign assistance by multilatera. organizations cannot be factored in until there is resolution of the issues likely to interrupt internal development. If the U.S.-led, UN-sponsored assistance to Somalia is a harbinger of future international involvement, only the direct of humanitarian crises will mobilize international organizations for massive and humanitarian support to establish or reestablish a nation's infrastructure. The Ethiopians will probably receive only limited support from international organizations, multilateral non-government aid organizations, regional organizations, and other nations. The onus is on the sovereign state of Ethiopia to rebuild itself from the rubble of years of civil strife and natural disaster.

#### UNITED STATES' STRATEGIC INTEREST

"So far, senior officials in the Bush administration have shown little interest in Africa. This attitude is not likely to change in the near future unless private organizations can put pressure on the administration to pay more attention to Africa. In order for them to do so, they must devote more time and attention to strengthening the domestic constituency for Africa. Until this happens, U.S. policymakers will continue to respond to most African problems in an uncoordinated, ad hoc, crisis-by-crisis fashion."

Then U.S. President George Busn's decision to intervene to provide humanitarian assistance, particularly famine relief, in the Somalia crisis in December 1992 certainly conforms to this assessment. Whether this will hold true for the Clinton administration remains to be seen. The U.S. Congressional Black Caucus has had nominal influence on the aid money devoted to Sub-Saharan Africa, having increased the Bush administration's 1991 proposed budget allocation from \$560 million to \$800 million. Whether this interest will continue, or whether Echiopia will be the recipient of future sub-Saharan aid, also remains to be seen. Prior to the Marxist takeover by Mengistu, Ethiopia was the recipient of the largest portion of U.S. assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa, but that was a part of the now-dead Cold War struggle to counter Soviet influence in the region.

The vital interest of the U.S. now lies in Southwest Asia because of western dependence on the oil flow. As noted earlier. Ethiopia and the Horn were not strategically essential to the Gulf War victory. None of the products of Ethiopia are of strategic importance to the U.S. Located near the entrance to

the Red Sea, Ethiopia has the potential to interfere with maritime traffic through the Bab el Mandeb, but there is no reason to believe such interference will occur. In the long term, "Ethiopia's manpower, combined with its strategic position, could make it a major force in the region in time." But that factor alone will not place Ethiopia in the vital strategic interest category.

"Notwithstanding political and strategic considerations, and humanitarian impulses, helping the people of the region to establish free and democratic institutions and a way of life based on the values of liberal democracy would arguably be in the best tradition of Western ideals. In pursuing such goals, Western interests - as well as those of the people of the Horn - might also be served." The U.S. has demonstrated through its involvement in Somalia its willingness to shoulder the burden of catastrophe, and Ethiopia has shared that burden by accepting refugees and hosting talks by Somali leaders. Ethiopia has also been a conduit for humanitarian support to Sudanese of southern Sudan. The U.S. needs stabilizing governments in every region, and clearly Ethiopia has the size and potential to assume that role in the Horn.

The issue of alignment of Ethiopia or Eritrea, should Eritrea elect independence, is one that has been noted but has not generated concern as a major threat to the U.S. The Iraqi attempt to advance its influence among north African states has had minimal impact on U.S. interests, strategic or military,

during the ongoing crisis in the Gulf." There is legitimate concern over the increasing capability of the Iranian military. There is little reason to believe that alignment by Black African states with Iran could result in a military alliance hostile to U.S. interests. Any regional cooperation or alignment that bolsters the economic situation of the African states should be encouraged. One of the main concerns of the international community about the disaster in Somalia was the lack of regional involvement in solving Somalia's problems.

Arms proliferation in Ethiopia is another problem because of an historic readiness to solve problems of ethnic rivalry through armed conflict rather than discussion. One way the U.S. and other international entities can assist is to half the flow of additional arms and ammunition into Ethiopia. For the present, this could be done by international agreement. Should Ethiopia erupt into civil war again, the UN could sanction an embargo. This suggests the model of isolating the conflict and letting it run its course. There is a point in this strategy of attrition where intervention is necessary to prevent genocide. This type of intervention would be of a peacemaking nature.

The model of isolation has also been suggested to allow Ethiopia to solve all of its very complicated problems. As stated earlier, what happens in any one state can have a ripple effect throughout the region and ultimately the world. "The inevitable conclusion is that there is no end in sight to most of the conflicts and plights that afflict the Horn, and that these

will affect the wider international community at the level of principle, but not vital, interests." There have been recent positive developments in Ethiopia, from the reality of a public referendum in 1992 to the promise of another in 1993, as well as the lessening of violence and a dramatic drop in the death toll attributable to starvation and civil war violence. Continuation of support at the same or higher levels may be necessary to encourage these trends. These are interests of principle to the U.S. and are therefore worthy of our investment in time, energy, and money.

Ethiopia is the home base for the Organization for African Unity (OAU). Regional stability is a central tenet to world stability, and regional stability is best negotiated by regional organizations, such as the OAU. U.S. support of Ethiopia is a clear signal to the OAU and its other members of general U.S. support to African nations struggling with democracy.

### CONCLUSION

As Martin Lowenkopf, writing for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, noted, "Four horsemen of the apocalypse...[sit] bestride the continent - internal wars...: famine and refugees; a vicious circle of drought, floods, pests, and now AIDS...; and...continuing crushing debt and economic crises." Ethiopia will be a power in Africa because of its size, location, history, and other factors. It is incumpent on the U.S. to help it become a power that contributes to regional

and world peace and prosperity. These are U.S. strategic goals and humanitarian responsibilities.

# **ENDNOTES**

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